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I. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A. MANDAMUS AND OTHER ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS
URING this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court and inter-
mediate appellate courts continued the trend toward granting
mandamus to enforce arbitration clauses' and reverse overly
broad discovery orders. 2 In addition, the supreme court (by a narrow
margin of five justices) extended mandamus relief to enforce contractual
venue and forum selection provisions, areas previously identified as inci-
dental trial court rulings not supporting mandamus relief.3 The courts
also grappled with the propriety of mandamus in cases involving the de-
nial of a motion to dismiss for an inadequate or untimely expert affidavit
in medical malpractice cases.
4
1. Medical Malpractice Claims
In medical malpractice lawsuits, the plaintiff must present a timely and
adequate expert affidavit supporting his claims within the first 120 days
after filing the lawsuit or the lawsuit must be dismissed. 5 The plaintiff
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1. See, e.g., In re First Tex. Homes, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 868, 868 (Tex. 2003) (orig.
proceeding).
2. See, e.g., In re Dana Corp., 138 S.W.3d 298, 302 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
3. See In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 120 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-41 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
4. See, e.g., In re Woman's Hosp. of Tex., Inc., 141 S.W.3d 144, 153 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding) (Owen, J., dissenting from denial of ten mandamus petitions seeking relief
from denial of motion to dismiss in medical malpractice cases).
5. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, Act of May 5, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 140,
§ 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 985, repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204,
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may obtain a thirty-day extension to file the affidavit when noncompli-
ance is unintentional. 6 Effective September 1, 2003, the Texas Legisla-
ture amended section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code to provide for an interlocutory appeal if a trial court refuses to dis-
miss a health care liability claim when no timely, adequate expert affida-
vit is filed. 7 However, for the thousands of medical malpractice claims
pending prior to September 1, 2003, there is no statutory right to interloc-
utory appeal. As a result, the appellate courts have issued conflicting rul-
ings on whether mandamus is available to review the denial of a motion
to dismiss in a medical malpractice case.8
The supreme court had the opportunity to resolve the confusion in ten
mandamus petitions, all asking whether the denial of a motion to dismiss
a medical malpractice claim is subject to review by mandamus. However,
rather than resolve the question, the supreme court declined review of all
ten petitions without opinion.9 As one justice noted, "With more than a
thousand 4590i cases reportedly still in the pipeline, the intermediate
courts are sure to see this issue again." 10
2. Discovery Rulings
The Texas Supreme Court continued a longstanding trend of granting
mandamus to address overly broad discovery orders, especially when
such orders required production of privileged or potentially privileged
materials. For instance, in In re Dana Corp., the supreme court granted
mandamus to correct a trial court's order requiring a defendant in an
asbestos-related case to produce seventy-five years worth of insurance
policies. 1 The court noted that the discovery order was overly broad
§10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884, and recodified at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 74.351 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) [hereinafter § 74.351]).
6. § 74.351(c).
7. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
8. See In re Watamull, 127 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, orig. proceed-ing, pet. denied); see also In re Zimmerman, 148 S.W.3d 214, 216-17 (Tex. App.-Texar-kana 2004, orig. proceeding, no pet.) (acknowledging that mandamus may lie to review a
trial court's failure to dismiss a medical malpractice case, but finding no abuse of discretionby the trial court in granting 30-day extension to file expert affidavit). Cf In re Schneider,
134 S.W.3d 866, 869-70 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, orig. proceeding, no pet.)(concluding that because the legislature provided for interlocutory appeals in medical mal-practice cases only prospectively, mandamus will not issue in pre-September 2003 cases).
9. See Woman's Hosp. of Tex., Inc., 141 S.W.3d at 146; In re Horswell, 47 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 346 (Mar. 5, 2004); In re Shapiro, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346 (Mar. 5, 2004); In re Rodri-guez, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346 (Mar. 5, 2004); In re Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 47Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346 (Mar. 5, 2004); In re Barker, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346 (Mar. 5, 2004); In re
Southside Fam. Care Assocs., 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346 (Mar. 5, 2004); In re Riverside Hosp.,
Inc., 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346 (Mar. 5, 2004); In re Farley, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346 (Mar. 5,2004); In re Redels, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346 (Mar. 5, 2004).
10. Schneider, 134 S.W.3d at 872 (Frost, J., concurring).
11. 138 S.W.3d 289, 300-02 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see also In reSears, Roebuck & Co., 146 S.W.3d 328, 334 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding,
no pet.) (per curiam) (granting mandamus after finding trial court abused its discretion in
ordering automobile manufacturer to produce all claim files for extensive list of repair
shop chain's asbestos-related workers' compensation claims); In re Merck & Co., Inc., 150S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, orig. proceeding, no pet.) (granting man-
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because the plaintiff failed to show that all of the insurance policies cov-
ering the full seventy-five years were potentially relevant.
12
Similarly, in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., the supreme court
granted mandamus to correct a trial court's order requiring production of
all documents on defendant's privilege log.13 In DuPont, the trial court
found that the defendant's privilege log failed to establish a prima facie
case of privilege over the referenced communications and thus ordered
production of all documents. 14 The supreme court granted mandamus
review, reviewed each portion of the privilege log, and concluded that,
with the exception of one category of documents that had no explanation
of privilege attached to them, defendants met their burden to establish a
prima facie case of privilege over the logged documents.
15
In In re Kuntz, the supreme court granted mandamus to reverse a dis-
covery order requiring an individual to produce a third party's privileged
trade secrets. 16 Hal Kuntz worked for a geology company that prepared
letters of recommendation for an oil company analyzing potential oil
prospects. Kuntz's ex-wife sought to discover these letters of recommen-
dation to show Kuntz's future income. The trial court ordered Kuntz to
produce the letters of recommendation to his ex-wife. On mandamus,
Kuntz challenged the trial court's order, claiming that although he had
access to the letters of recommendation, the letters were not in his "pos-
session, custody, or control" as required under Rule 192.7(b) because the
letters belonged to the oil company, and he was expressly prohibited
from sharing the letters with third parties. In reviewing the trial court's
order, the supreme court addressed for the first time how to interpret the
phrase "possession, custody, or control" as used in the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure 192.3(b) and 192.7(b). 17 Although the court did not pro-
vide a complete definition of "possession, custody, or control," the court
held that "mere access to the relevant letters of recommendation does
not constitute 'physical possession' of the documents under the definition
of 'possession, custody, or control' set forth in the Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 192.7(b)."'1 8 The court further concluded that Kuntz had no
adequate remedy by appeal because he was contractually obligated not to
disclose the information. If required to disclose the materials and then
challenge it on appeal, the harm in breaching his confidentiality agree-
damus after finding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering production of informa-
tion related to different pharmaceutical product than the product at issue in the lawsuit).
12. Dana, 138 S.W.3d at 301-02; see also In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex.
2003) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (granting mandamus to correct trial court's order
compelling discovery of 30 years of information regarding safety employees and company
physicians).
13. 136 S.W.3d 218, 225-26 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
14. Id.
15. Id. Cf. In re Maher, 143 S.W.3d 907, 914-15 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, orig.
proceeding, no pet.) (granting mandamus to compel production of items not properly iden-
tified on privilege log).
16. 124 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).
17. Id. at 180.
18. Id. at 184.
20051
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ment would already have been done. 19
3. Disqualification Rulings
The supreme court has long held that mandamus is appropriate to cor-
rect a trial court's failure to disqualify counsel with a conflict of interest.20
In this Survey period, the supreme court held that the same principles
apply when a law firm contractually agrees to maintain indefinitely the
confidences of an ex-employee's former client.2 1 In In re Mitcham, the
supreme court reviewed a law firm's agreement not to sue the former
client of one of the firm's associates. The court concluded that because
the agreement placed no time limitations on the law firm's promise not to
pursue claims against the client, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in disqualifying counsel. 22
Mandamus is also traditionally available to correct a visiting judge's
failure to honor a timely objection to his assignment.2 3 However, in a
unique opinion, the Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that manda-
mus would not issue to correct a visiting judge's decision to remove him-
self based on an untimely objection to his assignment. 24 The court
reasoned that "[t]his is the opposite of the usual situation. If the objec-
tion had been timely,... [the judge] would be in violation of a mandatory
statute and mandamus would lie."'2 5 Because there is no statute requiring
an assigned judge to refuse to remove himself from a case, the fact that ajudge mistakenly does so when the objection was untimely does not re-
quire mandamus relief.26
4. Arbitration Rulings
The Texas Supreme Court has consistently held that mandamus will lie
to enforce a clause providing for arbitration under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.27 In this Survey period, the court was faced with the question of
whether a court or arbitrator should rule on class certification issues
"when the contracts at issue committed all disputes arising out of the
19. Id.
20. See Nat'l Med. Enters. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 123-24 (Tex. 1996).
21. In re Mitcham, 133 S.W.3d 274, 276-77 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
22. Id.
23. Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).
24. See In re Naylor, 120 S.W.3d 498, 501-02 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, orig. pro-
ceeding, pet. denied).
25. Id. at 501.
26. Id. at 502.
27. See, e.g., In re First Tex. Homes, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 868, 869 (Tex. 2003) (orig. pro-
ceeding) (per curiam) (granting mandamus petition to enforce arbitration clause in home
construction agreement); see also Feldman/Matz Interests, L.L.P. v. Settlement Capital
Corp., 140 S.W.3d 879, 887-88 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (granting
mandamus relief to enforce Federal Arbitration Agreement and holding that trial court
could not enter any ruling, including injunction to maintain the status quo during arbitra-
tion proceedings); In re R&R Pers. Specialists of Tyler, Inc., 146 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 2004, orig. proceeding, no pet.) (granting mandamus to compel arbitration,
finding that claims that arbitration is waived are to be resolved by the arbitrator).
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agreement to the arbitrator. '28 Following the recent holding of the
United States Supreme Court in Green Tree Financial Co. v. Bazzle,29 the
Texas Supreme Court held that in light of the express contractual agree-
ment to submit all issues to arbitration, the appellate court abused its
discretion in directing the trial court to decide the class certification is-
sue.30 The Texas Supreme Court further held that a party denied the




As a general rule, mandamus does not issue to correct incidental trial
court rulings. However, in four instances during this Survey period, the
Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus to correct such incidental rul-
ings as consolidation orders and venue. For instance, in In re Van Waters
& Rogers, Inc., the supreme court held per curiam that mandamus would
issue to correct the improper consolidation of twenty plaintiffs into a sin-
gle lawsuit. 32 The court acknowledged that such consolidation orders do
not ordinarily support mandamus relief.33 However, the court reasoned
that extraordinary circumstances-specifically, the confusion and
prejudice to the defendants from the consolidated trials requiring differ-
ent facts as to different parties-justified mandamus under the facts of
this case. 34
In two opinions during this Survey period, a divided court narrowly
granted mandamus relief to enforce the parties' contractual agreements.
In In re AIU Insurance Co., the supreme court held that mandamus will
lie to enforce a forum selection clause. 35 The majority likened the forum
selection clause to an arbitration clause and reasoned that "[s]ubjecting a
party to trial in a forum other than that agreed upon and requiring an
appeal to vindicate the rights granted in a forum-selection clause is clear
harassment. " 36
The supreme court also granted mandamus to correct a trial court's
order denying a motion to transfer venue from a state district court to the
Public Utility Commission ("PUC"). The court noted that a venue ruling
is an incidental ruling that does not normally justify mandamus. 37 How-
28. See In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d 367, 368 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
29. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
30. Wood, 140 S.W.3d at 370.
31. Id.
32. 145 S.W.3d 203, 206 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
33. Id. at 211.
34. Id. at 210.
35. 148 S.W.3d 109, 110 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
36. Id. at 117.
37. See In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). But
see In re Daly, 148 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, orig. proceeding, no pet. h.)
(granting mandamus relief to enforce mandatory venue provisions in suit affecting the par-
ent-child relationship); Fincher v. Wright, 141 S.W.3d 255, 264 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2004, no pet.) (finding mandamus appropriate remedy for trial court's failure to follow
20051
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ever, citing "unique circumstances," the court held that mandamus was
appropriate where the PUC had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
challenges to utility rates and thus, "permitting a trial to go forward
would interfere with the important legislatively mandated function and
purpose of the PUG."' 38 The court reasoned that,
if the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction in this dispute, the judicial ap-
propriation of state agency authority would be a clear disruption of
the "orderly process of government." This disruption, coupled with
the hardship imposed on Entergy by a postponed appellate review,
warrants an exception to our general proscription against using man-
damus to correct incidental trial court rulings.39
The four justice dissent in In re AIU Insurance Co., comprising Justices
Phillips, O'Neill, Jefferson, and Schneider, reasoned that unlike arbitra-
tion agreements, Texas public policy does not favor forum selection
clauses. 40 Moreover, the dissent concluded that "we do not specifically
enforce contractual rights by mandamus. '41
In a second opinion decided on the same day as AIU, the same divided
court decided In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America.42 In Prudential,
the same five justice majority granted mandamus to enforce a contractualjury waiver provision. The court quickly concluded that the refusal to
enforce the contractual jury waiver "was a clear abuse of discretion. '43
As a result, the only question was whether the parties had an adequate
remedy by appeal for the trial court's error.44 The majority acknowl-
edged that the term "adequate" has "no comprehensive definition," but
proceeded to articulate a new standard for determining whether there is
an adequate remedy by appeal.4 5 Specifically, the court stated that man-
damus is permitted,
to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impair-
ment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful
direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals
from final judgments, and spare private parties and the public the
time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of im-
properly conducted proceedings. An appellate remedy is "ade-
quate" when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by
the detriments. When the benefits outweigh the detriments, appel-
late courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is
proper procedures in determining venue); In re Shell Oil Co., 128 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding, no pet. h.) ("Although mandamus is not availa-
ble to review the propriety of venue ... it is properly employed to correct improper venue
procedure.") (internal citations omitted).
38. Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d at 321.
39. Id.
40. AIU, 148 S.W.3d at 122-23 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 123.
42. 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
43. Id. at 135.
44. Id. at 135-36.
45. Id. at 136.
[Vol. 58
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adequate. 46
The majority went on to conclude that enforcement of a contractual right
to waive trial by jury cannot be rectified on appeal. As in AIU, the court
analogized the contractual jury waiver to a contractual agreement to arbi-
trate and held that there was no adequate remedy by appeal.
47
The dissenting justices, the same four dissenting in the AIU opinion,
argued that mandamus should not apply to enforce the parties' contrac-
tual rights. 48
In another case involving the trial court's exclusive jurisdiction over a
child-custody battle, the court took the opposite approach. The court
held in In re Forlenza that the trial court acted within its discretion in
retaining jurisdiction over the children, and reversed the court of appeals
order finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.49
b. Mandamus Denied
Notwithstanding the court's rulings in AIU and Prudential, the general
rule remains that mandamus will not lie to review incidental trial court
rulings. Indeed, in a case involving hundreds of plaintiffs, the supreme
court granted oral argument to hear a petition for writ of mandamus ask-
ing that the trial court be required to release settlement funds tendered to
the court but not recovered by absentee plaintiffs. 50 The court denied
mandamus relief, holding that mandamus will not lie simply to expedite
payment of money to a party.5'
6. Elections, Municipalities, and Politics
Election years frequently bring with them mandamus petitions requir-
ing the appellate court's immediate attention. This year was no excep-
tion. In In re Newton, Democratic candidates to the Texas House of
Representatives sued a Republican Political Action Committee ("PAC")
for unlawful payments in violation of the Election Code.52 The Demo-
cratic candidates obtained a temporary restraining order, restraining the
PAC from making further contributions. A hearing on the permanent
injunction was set fourteen days later, one day after the general election.
Wasting no time, the PAC sought mandamus relief directly from the
Texas Supreme Court. The supreme court held that mandamus directly
to the supreme court was proper because the issue of the PAC's ability to
contribute to state elections was an issue of statewide importance. 53
46. Id.
47. Id. at 134-35.
48. Id. at 141-43 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
49. 140 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
50. In re Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 139 S.W.3d 669, 670 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding).
51. Id.
52. 146 S.W.3d 648, 649 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
53. Id. at 650.
2005]
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The court strongly criticized the trial court's temporary restraining or-
der ("TRO") as failing to maintain the status quo and effectively taking
away the PAC's rights by setting the preliminary injunction on a date af-
ter the elections. 54 The court directed the trial court to vacate its tempo-
rary restraining order and, in a somewhat unusual step, further ordered
the trial court "to furnish the Clerk of this Court proof of compliance by
4:00 p.m." on the same day the court's opinion was issued.55
In In re Dupont, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals granted mandamus
relief to compel the chairperson of the Parker County Republican Party
to certify a candidate duly elected by a majority of the county's precinct
chairs.5 6 The party chairperson complained that she was not obligated to
certify the candidate's name on the election ballot because proper parlia-
mentary procedures had not been followed during the election process.
The court of appeals ignored this argument, noting that "we do not con-
cern ourselves with parliamentary procedure. '57
Mandamus is also the appropriate remedy where a judge refuses to
take actions in direct contravention to a municipal statute. In In re Fitz-
gerald, the supreme court granted mandamus to direct a county judge to
order an incorporation election as required under Section 8.003 of the
Texas Local Government Code, when there was no basis to deny the peti-
tion for such an election.58
In In re Suson, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals granted mandamus
to order the city secretary for the home rule city of Kingsville to submit a
petition to recall the mayor and other city officials to the city commis-
sioner.59 The court agreed with the city secretary that the petition did not
contain the minimum signatures necessary to support a recall election.
However, upon review of the city's charter, the court concluded that the
secretary and city commission had no authority to review the sufficiency
of the recall petition.60 Thus, despite the inadequacy of the petition, the
city officials were obligated to forward the petition and order the recall
election, and the only remedy available to those subject to the recall was
to file a lawsuit and have a court determine the petition to be
inadequate. 61
7. Void Orders
Mandamus is typically available to correct void orders. However, al-
though finding a trial court's order granting a new trial void when entered
after plenary jurisdiction had expired, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in
54. Id. at 652.
55. Id. at 653.
56. 142 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, orig. proceeding, no pet.).
57. Id.
58. 140 S.W.3d 380, 381 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
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In re Gillespie nonetheless refused to issue a writ of mandamus. 62 In Gil-
lespie, the trial court determined that it had plenary jurisdiction to grant a
new trial based on the Fourteenth District Court's 1991 opinion, Elec-
tronic Power Design, Inc. v. R.A. Hanson Co., in which the court held that
a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law extends the court's
plenary power. 63 On mandamus, the Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals reversed its holding in Electronic Power Design and held for the
first time that the request for findings of fact and conclusions of law did
not extend the trial court's plenary power. 64
Under Electronic Power Design, the trial court's new order would have
been entered within its plenary power.65 However, by reversing Elec-
tronic Power Design, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the trial court's plenary power had expired by the time the
new trial order was signed, making the order void.66 Despite the void
order, however, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals determined
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for
new trial based on the then controlling precedent. 67 Thus, the court de-
nied the mandamus petition without prejudice, reurging the trial court
not to correct its error based on the now controlling precedent.68
8. Waiver on Mandamus
Although arguments on direct appeal must be raised in the court of
appeals before they can be asserted in the Texas Supreme Court, the
same is not true for mandamus proceedings. In In re AIU Insurance Co.,
the court rejected the argument that the petitioner waived certain argu-
ments by failing to raise them in the court of appeals before asserting
them to the supreme court.69 The court reasoned "[w]hile it is certainly
the better practice to present all arguments to a court of appeals before
seeking mandamus in this Court, the failure to do so is not a failure to
preserve error as it ordinarily would be in an appeal."'70
9. Other Original Proceedings
Appellate courts have limited injunctive powers that are granted only
sparingly. In In re Health Discovery Corp., the Waco Court of Appeals
recognized that it does not have the authority to grant a writ of injunction
solely to preserve the status quo pending appeal. 71 However, it con-
cluded that a writ of injunction will issue to preserve the status quo on
62. 124 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding, no
pet.).
63. 821 S.W.2d 170, 171 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
64. Gillespie, 124 S.W.3d at 703-04.




69. 148 S.W.3d 109, 121 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
70. Id.
71. 148 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, orig. proceeding, no pet.).
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
interlocutory appeal from the denial of an injunction. 72
II. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
A. PERMISSIVE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
Section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code pro-
vides for a permissive interlocutory appeal. 73 Under that provision, a
court of appeals may permit an appeal to be taken from an otherwise
nonappealable order but only if, among other requirements, the appeal is
ordered by the trial court pursuant to the terms of subsection (d).74 An
appellate court's ability to permit an appeal under section 51.014(f) is not
"purely discretionary" or independent of section 51.014(d)'s
requirements. 75
Several courts of appeals have split on the issue of time extensions for
filing an application for permission to appeal under section 51.014(f).
The deadline for filing an application in the court of appeals is ten days
after the date the trial court grants permission to appeal.76 What happens
if the appellant fails entirely to file an application for permission to ap-
peal and instead files a regular notice of appeal more than ten days after
the trial court's grant of permission to appeal?
The San Antonio Court of Appeals considered this issue in Stolte v.
County of Guadalupe77 and concluded that: (1) the appellant's notice of
appeal was an instrument filed in a bona fide attempt to invoke the
court's appellate jurisdiction and was thus sufficient to invoke the court's
jurisdiction, (2) Appellate Rule 26.3 allowing time extensions for perfect-
ing appeal applies in the agreed appeal context, and (3) Verburgt v. Dor-
ner's78 implied motion for time extensions applies in the agreed appeal
context. 79 The appellant in Stolte was, accordingly, given an opportunity
to cure his failure to file the proper instrument and to explain his
untimeliness. 80
72. Id.
73. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
74. See Watson v. Moray, 133 S.W.3d 877, 877 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, orig. proced-
ing [mand. denied]); Serrano v. Union Planter's Bank, N.A., 155 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 2004, no pet.). In addition to the trial court ordering the appeal, (1) the parties
must agree that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a
substantial ground for difference of opinion, (2) there must be a determination that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, and (3) the parties must agree to the interlocutory appeal. TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d). Only then may the court of appeals consider permitting the
appeal. Id. § 51.014(f).
75. Watson, 133 S.W.3d at 877.
76. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d), (f).
77. 139 S.W.3d 406, 407-10 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.), rev'd on other
grounds, No. 04-04-00083-CV, 2004 WL 2597443 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Nov. 17, 2004,
no pet.) (not designated for publication).
78. 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997).
79. Stolte, 139 S.W.3d at 408-10.
80. Id. at 410.
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The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals agreed in Diamond Products
International, Inc. v. Handsel that the failure to file an application for
permission to appeal should not result in automatic dismissal without an
opportunity to cure when the appellant fails to file an application but files
a notice of appeal.81
It is not so in the Dallas Court of Appeals. In In re D.B., the Dallas
Court of Appeals concluded that the extension of time provided in Rule
26.3(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure does not apply in sec-
tion 51.014(d) appeals.82 The court reasoned that "[b]ecause the deadline
for perfecting an appeal from an interlocutory order pursuant to section
51.014(d) is specifically stated in section 51.014(f), the deadline and ex-
tension for perfecting an appeal in the rules of appellate procedure do
not apply."' 83 The Stolte court disagreed with this reasoning because (1)
the supreme court in Verburgt made no distinction between types of ap-
peals and (2) "the Notes and Comments to [Texas] Rule [of Appellate
Procedure] 26 expressly provide that 'an extension of time is available for
all appeals."' 84
What about the contents of an application to appeal under section
51.014(f)? The Stolte court explained that an application should include
"facts and argument addressing the requirements of section 51.014(d)-
that the order 'involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a
substantial ground for difference of opinion' and that 'an immediate ap-
peal . . . may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.' ",85
The types of disputes reserved for agreed interlocutory appeals are
those that can be resolved by a controlling legal issue-"[t]he statute does
not contemplate permissive appeals of summary judgments where the
facts are in dispute."'86
81. 142 S.W.3d 491, 493-94 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Notably,
however, the appellant in Diamond filed his notice of appeal within ten days after the trial
court granted permission to appeal.
82. 80 S.W.3d 698, 701-02 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
83. Id. at 702.
84. Stolte, 139 S.W.3d at 409 (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 410 (citing Richardson v. Kays, No. 02-03-00241-CV, 2003 WL 22457054, at
*2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Oct. 30, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publica-
tion) (denying application to appeal that did "not mention, discuss, or analyze why the
issue... involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for
difference of opinion"); see also TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d). Accord
Diamond, 142 S.W.3d at 494. Ultimately, the Stolte court refused permission to appeal
based on the appellant's initial application, which contained no facts or argument explain-
ing why the court should have granted permission. The court, however, granted the appel-
lant leave to amend his application to meet the requirements stated in the opinion. Stolte,
139 S.W.3d at 410.
86. Diamond, 142 S.W.3d at 494.
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B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS AS OF RIGHT
1. Pleas to the Jurisdiction
Under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8), the
Texas courts of appeals have the authority to review an appeal from an
interlocutory order that "grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a
governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001."' 87 The pol-
icy reason behind this authority "is that the State should not have to ex-
pend resources in trying a case on the merits if it is immune from suit."'88
However, despite the deceptively simple language of section 51.014(a)(8),
the fact that an argument is raised in a plea to the jurisdiction does not
mean the order denying it is subject to interlocutory appeal. The refer-
ence to "plea to the jurisdiction" in the statute "is not to a particular
procedural vehicle but to the substance of the issue raised." 89
For example, the Attorney General's challenge in State v. Fernandez-
by way of a plea to the jurisdiction-to a probate court's decision to
transfer certain actions from district court to probate court was not re-
viewable by interlocutory appeal because the challenge was not a proper
subject for a plea to the jurisdiction.90 Similarly, a plaintiff's failure to
give notice required under the Tort Claims Act is not a proper basis for
dismissal and cannot be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction.91 As clarified
by the supreme court:
an interlocutory appeal may be taken from a refusal to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction whether the jurisdictional argument is presented
by plea to the jurisdiction or some other vehicle, such as a motion for
summary judgment. By the same token, an interlocutory appeal can-
not be taken from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction that does
not raise an issue that can be jurisdictional.92
2. Denial of arbitration
Under the Texas Arbitration Act, a trial court's order denying a motion
to compel arbitration brought under the Act may be reviewed by inter-
locutory appeal. 93 However, if the motion denied is brought under the
Federal Arbitration Act, mandamus is the appropriate remedy. 94 The
Federal Arbitration Act governs an arbitration agreement if it is con-
87. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
88. State v. Fernandez, No. 13-03-00546-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 5257, at *26 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi June 16, 2004, no pet.) (Castillo, J., concurring and dissenting).
89. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. 2004).
90. Fernandez, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 5257, at *26-28.
91. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. 2004);
Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 348-49.
92. Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 349.
93. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005);
Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB v. Alaniz, No. 13-04-073-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 7029, at
*7 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi August 5, 2004, no pet.).
94. Merill Lynch, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 7029, at *7.
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tained in a contract that "involves or affects interstate commerce. '95
3. Denial of special appearance
Section 51.014(a)(7) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code autho-
rizes an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a special appear-
ance. 96 While the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure appear to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law "optional" in the interlocutory ap-
peal context,97 the Dallas Court of Appeals recently remanded a special
appearance appeal back to the trial court because the findings and con-
clusions entered by the trial court did not address the issues of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, forcing the court of appeals to guess the
reason or reasons for the trial court's finding of jurisdiction. 98 These cir-
cumstances prevented adequate presentation of the appellant's appeal,
requiring remand.99
C. BRIEFING ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Under Rule 28.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court
of appeals may allow an interlocutory appeal to be submitted without
briefs. 100 The purpose of the rule is "to grant appellate courts the flexibil-
ity to expedite appeals by dispensing with the necessity of a formal record
or briefing."10 1 The rule does not, however, give a party who believes
that briefs are unnecessary an option to simply announce its decision not
to file a brief.10 2 Instead, such a party must file a proper motion, accom-
panied by the appropriate filing fee, demonstrating why briefs should not
be required.10 3
D. TRIAL COURT'S POWER PENDING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Statutory stay provisions applicable in certain interlocutory appeals
limit the trial court's power to act while an interlocutory appeal is pend-
ing. For example, a trial court may not grant summary judgment while an
interlocutory appeal is pending in a case subject to the stay provisions of
section 51.014(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.10 4 Sec-
tion 51.014(b)'s stay of the "commencement of a trial" prohibits such an
act because a summary judgment proceeding is a trial within the meaning
95. Id. (concluding that transaction involved interstate commerce and dismissing inter-
locutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction); see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
96. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
97. TEX. R. App. P. 28.1.
98. Hoffman v. Dandurand, 143 S.W.3d 555, 560 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
99. Id.
100. TEX. R. App. P. 28.3.
101. In re J.S., 136 S.W.3d 716, 717 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Lee-Hickman's Invs. v. Alpha Invesco Corp., 139 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex. App.-




of that statute. 10 5 While Rule 29.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure gives the trial court authority to proceed with a trial on the merits
while an interlocutory appeal is pending, it does so only "if permitted by
law," acknowledging that a trial court may be prohibited by law from
doing so, as, for example, by section 51.014(b). 10 6 Further, Rule 29.5 pro-
hibits the trial court from making an order that "interferes with or im-
pairs the jurisdiction of the appellate court or the effectiveness of any
relief sought or that may be granted on appeal.' 0 7 A final summary
judgment may very well interfere with the jurisdiction of the court of ap-
peals, which may be compelled to dismiss the interlocutory appeal as
moot in light of the final summary judgment. 10 8
E. TEXAS SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION OVER
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS.
The Texas Supreme Court freely exercised jurisdiction over a number
of interlocutory appeals during the Survey period. For example, in J.M.
Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, the supreme court accepted an interlocutory
appeal without comment as to the source of its jurisdiction, where the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement was at issue. 10 9 The court simi-
larly decided San Antonio State Hospital v. Cowan, an interlocutory ap-
peal from the trial court's denial of the defendant's plea to the
jurisdiction, without any discussion as to the basis of its jurisdiction. 1 0
In a number of cases decided under the former, more stringent rules
governing the supreme court's "conflicts" jurisdiction, the court
nevertheless determined that it had jurisdiction in the interlocutory
appeal context. 11' In Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife v.
105. Lee-Hickman's Invs., 139 S.W.3d at 701.
106. Id. at 702 n.4; TEX. R. App. P. 29.5.
107. TEX. R. App. P. 29.5(b).
108. Lee-Hickman's Invs., 139 S.W.3d at 702.
109. 128 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. 2003). The court's jurisdiction over the appeal appeared
to be based on a dissenting opinion in the court of appeals, demonstrating a conflict be-
tween the justices of that court. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 22.225(c), 22.001(a)(1)
(Vernon 2004).
110. 128 S.W.3d 244, 245 (Tex. 2004). The court did, however, specifically reference
sections 22.001(a)(1) and 22.225(c) of the Texas Government Code, which permit the su-
preme court to accept cases in which the justices of the court of appeals disagree on a
question of law material to the decision. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 22.225(c),
22.001(a)(1) (Vernon 2004).
111. Previously, the supreme court's "conflicts" jurisdiction extended only to interlocu-
tory appeals where the court of appeals's decision conflicted with "a prior decision of an-
other court of appeals or of the supreme court on a question of law material to a decision
of the case." TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.001(a)(2) (Vernon 2004). Under that standard,
two decisions conflicted only when the two cases were so similar that the decision in one
case was necessarily conclusive of the decision in the other. Schein v. Stromboe, 102
S.W.3d 675, 687-88 (Tex. 2002). The Legislature amended section 22.001 of the Govern-
ment Code, effective September 1, 2003, effectively expanding the supreme court's juris-
diction over interlocutory appeals. See Act of June 11, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., Ch. 204, 2003
Tex. Gen. Laws 2004 (now codified as section 22.001(e) of the Texas Government Code).
Under the amended standard, which applies to actions filed on or after September 1, 2003,
"one court holds differently from another when there is inconsistency in their respective
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Miranda,112 a plea to the jurisdiction appeal, the supreme court con-
cluded that the court of appeals' decision that the trial court could not
consider evidence in support of the defendant's plea conflicted with the
supreme court's holding in Bland Independent School District v. Blue' 13
requiring trial courts to consider evidence when necessary to resolve ju-
risdictional issues. The court similarly exercised jurisdiction over a class
action appeal in Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray,1 4 when the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's certification of the class without a rigor-
ous analysis of predominance and superiority, as required under South-
western Refining Co. v. Bernal.115
III. PRESERVATION OF ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT
To preserve an issue for appeal, a litigant must make a timely, specific
objection at the earliest possible opportunity and obtain a ruling on the
record. 116 Failure to comply with these requirements will result in waiver
on appeal.117 During the Survey period, numerous courts explored the
scope of this rule in deciding how and when objections are properly pre-
served for review.
For example, in Schwartz v. Forest Pharmeceuticals, Inc., the court held
that the appellant waived any error in the admission of testimony regard-
ing the plaintiff's litigious character. 118 Even though the motion in limine
regarded evidence of prior lawsuits, the plaintiff did not object until after
the defendant was asked about several different lawsuits and the plaintiff
already gave substantial testimony about them. The court held this objec-
tion to be untimely and the issue waived, noting that a motion in limine
will not preserve error.119 The court further held that even if an objection
was timely, it must be the same objection raised on appeal to preserve
error.120
The appellant similarly waived error in Cruikshank v. Consumer Direct
Mortgage, Inc., in which he argued that the trial court had erroneously
decisions that should be clarified to remove unnecessary uncertainty in the law and unfair-
ness to litigants." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 22.001(e), 22.225(e) (Vernon 2004).
112. 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004).
113. 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000).
114. 135 S.W.3d 657, 662-63 (Tex. 2004).
115. 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000). See Snyder Communications, L.P. v. Magana, 142
S.W.3d 295, 298 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (exercising jurisdiction based on conflict between
court of appeals' analysis of class certification ruling and requirements of Bernal); see also
Exito Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 305 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (exercising
conflicts jurisdiction in special appearance appeal); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Lout-
zenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Tex. 2004) (exercising conflicts jurisdiction in plea to thejurisdiction appeal); Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 339 (Tex.
2004) (same).
116. TEX. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 251
(Tex. 2004).
117. Kerr-McGee Corp., 133 S.W.3d at 251.
118. 127 S.W.3d 118, 120 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
119. Id. at 123-24.
120. Id. at 125-26 (holding Rule 403 objection that evidence was unduly prejudicial did
not preserve relevance objection for appeal).
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sustained objections to the appellant's summary judgment affidavit.1 2
The court of appeals held that the appellant had not preserved error be-
cause he had not filed a response to the objecting party's motion to strike,
he did not object to the trial court's ruling, and he did not request the
court to reconsider its ruling.122 In another case, the court of appeals
held that the appellant failed to preserve error on its complaint regarding
an expert's qualifications because, although the appellant filed a motion
to exclude, it did not secure a ruling on the record.
12 3
Further, in Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson,124 a proceeding to rein-
state an arbitration award vacated by the district court in which the im-
partiality of the arbitrator was challenged after the arbitrator's award
issued, the court held that "a party can waive an otherwise valid objection
to the partiality of the arbitrator by proceeding with arbitration despite
knowledge of facts giving rise to such an objection. '125 This waiver prin-
ciple applies, the court held, "even where an evident partiality objection
could be asserted based on failure to disclose."'
1 26
Applying these principles, the court held that the appellees waived
their partiality objection based on the fact (disclosed during the arbitra-
tion hearing) that the arbitrator had suffered investment losses in the
stock of one of their former employers by failing to raise the objection
until after the arbitration award issued.127 The court rejected the appel-
lees' argument that the arbitrator failed to "divulge sufficient informa-
tion" for them to have waived the objection.128 The court also rejected
the argument that a waiver finding was inappropriate as to both appellees
because the arbitrator mentioned his stock losses to only one of the two
appellees, who was allegedly unfamiliar with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association. Noting that the appellee to whom disclosure
was not made had at least constructive notice of her rights, the court con-
cluded "[wle cannot reward parties for not reading legal documents that
affect them and then using their ignorance as a tool to undermine the
proceedings."' 29 Finally, the court rejected appellees' argument that
their lawyer did not know about the basis for the objection until after the
award was announced, holding that "Texas cases addressing evident parti-
121. 138 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
122. Id. at 499.
123. Pilgrim's Pride Corp. v. Smoak, 134 S.W.3d 880, 890 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004,
pet. denied).
124. 149 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. filed).
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Mariner Fin. Group, Inc. v. H.G. Bossley, 79 S.W.3d 30, 36 (Tex. 2002)
(Owen, J., concurring) ("There could be waiver of evident partiality based on nondisclo-
sure if the complaining party knew all the facts before the arbitration concluded and did
not complain.")).
127. Id. at 804-05.
128. Id. at 805 (citing Cook Indus. v. C. Itoh & Co., 449 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1971)
("When a party has knowledge of facts possibly indicating bias or partiality on the part of
the arbitrator he cannot remain silent and later object to the award of the arbitrator on
that ground.") (emphasis added)).
129. Id. (citing Estes v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 462 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex. 1970) (absent
fraud, failure to read contract generally is not ground to avoid it)).
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ality and waiver issues contemplate disclosure of relevant facts to a party,
with no mention of lawyers."'1 30 The court distinguished the decision in
Morin v. Boecker131 on the basis that Morin dealt with a party's receipt of
a communication from a court, which a party could reasonably assume
would also be sent to his attorney, while a communication from an arbi-
trator directly to a party would impose on the party the burden to dis-
close to counsel or risk waiver.1 32
In Tesfa v. Stewart,133 the court held that the appellants' objection to
each element of damages in a four-element damages question on the ba-
sis of no evidence to support submission of the issue was insufficiently
specific to preserve a broad form submission charge error for appeal.134
Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's decisions in In re B.L.D.,1 35 Harris
County v. Smith,136 and In re A.V.;1 3 7 the court held the charge error
waived because
Appellants did not object in any respect to the form of the damages
question, did not contend that some proper element of damages was
improperly comingled in a list with a damage element supported by
no evidence, and did not plainly inform the trial court that any spe-
cific element of damages-as opposed to every element of dam-
ages-should not be included in the broad-form submission.138
Again, in Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. v. Armstrong,139 the Texas Supreme
Court held that the defendant/appellant's pretrial motion to exclude the
testimony of the plaintiff/appellee's expert witness on the basis that his
opinions were unreliable did not preserve the complaint on appeal that
the testimony should have been excluded because the expert was unquali-
fied to testify.' 40
In other instances, however, courts have found error preserved. For
example, in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton,141 the Texas Supreme Court
refused to find waiver in a dispute over an oil and gas lease. At trial, the
lessor's only evidence of the amount of damages was the expert testimony
130. Id. at 805-06 (emphasis added) (citing Bossley, 79 S.W.3d at 32; Burlington N.R.R.
Co. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 635-39 (Tex. 1997)).
131. 122 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
132. Kendall Builders, 149 S.W.3d at 806 n.10.
133. 135 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
134. Id. at 275-76.
135. 113 S.W.3d 340, 349-50 (Tex. 2003) ("A timely objection, plainly informing the
court that a specific element of damages should not be included in a broad-form question
because there is no evidence to support its submission, therefore preserves the error for
appellate review.") (emphasis added) (quoting Harris County v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230, 236
(Tex. 2002)).
136. 96 S.W.3d 230, 236 (Tex. 2002).
137. 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (alleging broad-form charge error not preserved
when appellant "did not argue to the trial court that because the charge was based on a
theory without evidentiary support, the charge should not be submitted in broad form.")
(emphasis added).
138. Tesfa, 135 S.W.3d at 275-76.
139. 145 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. 2004).
140. Id. at 143-44 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 33.1).
141. 133 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. 2004).
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of a single witness. After cross-examination, the lessee objected and
moved to strike the expert's testimony as unreliable. The trial court de-
nied the motion. On appeal, the lessor argued that the point was waived
because the lessee did not object to the expert's testimony until after
cross-examination. The court rejected this argument and held that a mo-
tion to strike after cross-examination was sufficient to preserve error
when the basis for the objection became apparent on cross. 142
Similarly, in James v. Gruma Corp.,143 the court held that the appellant
preserved for review her argument that the defendant/appellee's plea in
abatement waived any defect in service when she argued in response to a
summary judgment motion that the defendant's plea in abatement consti-
tuted a general appearance. Although she did not specifically allege
waiver, the contention was "apparent from the context of her
response."'1 4
4
In Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp. v. Carpenter,145 the court addressed
the question of whether a response to a no-evidence summary judgment
motion must be filed to preserve a legal sufficiency objection for appeal,
noting a split of authority among the Texas courts of appeal on the is-
sue.146 Analogizing to the Texas Supreme Court's holding in McConnell
v. Southside Independent School District,147 applied by several courts of
appeal, 48 that a nonmovant need not object to the legal sufficiency of a
traditional motion for summary judgment to assert the complaint on ap-
peal, the court held that "no response need be filed to raise, on appeal,
the legal insufficiency of a no-evidence motion for summary
judgment."'1 49
Further, in In re M.N.G.,150 a termination of parental rights case, the
court held that the appellant did not waive her objection regarding equal-
ization of preemptory strikes by failing to timely object. The court noted
that objection must ordinarily be made "at the same time that the deter-
mination of antagonism by the trial court should be made-after voir dire
and prior to the exercise of the preemptory challenges allocated by the
142. Id. at 252.
143. 129 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied.).
144. Id. at 760.
145. 143 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
146. Id. at 562-63 (citing In re Estate of Swanson, 130 S.W.3d 144, 147 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 2003, no pet.) (response not required); see Cuyler v. Minns, 60 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (response not required); Callaghan Ranch,
Ltd. v. Killam, 53 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (response not
required); Roth v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P., 994 S.W.2d 190, 194-95 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1999, pet. denied) (response required); Williams v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 15
S.W.3d 110, 117 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.) (response required)).
147. 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993).
148. Cimarron, 143 S.W.3d at 563 (citing Swanson, 130 S.W.3d at 147 (applying Cuyler
and Callaghan Ranch)); Cuyler, 60 S.W.3d at 213-14; Callaghan Ranch, 53 S.W.3d at 3.
149. Cimarron, 143 S.W.3d at 563 (citing Crocker v. Paulyne's Nursing Home, Inc., 95
S.W.3d 416, 419 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.)).
150. 147 S.W.3d 521 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. filed).
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court."'1 51 Nonetheless, the court found no waiver because appellant,
who had been relying on a representation by the attorney ad litem that he
would not exercise any preemptory challenges and would leave jury se-
lection to appellant and appellee Texas Department of Family and Pro-
tective Services, objected as soon as it became apparent "that the ad litem
had coordinated his strikes with DFPS and that the ad litem planned to
use his six strikes after all."'152 Appellant also moved for a mistrial after
the jury was empaneled and sworn.153
The court noted a similarity between the circumstances of the case and
those in Van Allen v. Blackledge,1 54 a case in which the plaintiffs' objec-
tion to the defendants' improper coordination of preemptory challenges
was held to be timely, even though the plaintiff's motion for mistrial was
not urged until after the jury had been selected, seated and sworn. 155
Also of significance to the court in M.N. G. was that the attorney ad litem
admitted in a trial court hearing that he had informed counsel for appel-
lant that he "was aligned with the position of DFPS" and that he would
not exercise any peremptory challenges.1 56
The Texas Supreme Court also recently addressed the issue of preser-
vation in the specific context of objections to ad litem fees. In Jocson v.
Crabb,157 the Texas Supreme Court considered the question of whether
the defendants had waived their objections to ad litem fees awarded by
the trial court. Although the defendants had objected to the ad litem's
attendance at depositions, the court of appeals held that they had waived
their objections by failing to secure a ruling during the course of discov-
ery.158 Reversing, the Texas Supreme Court noted that while it "would
be wise" to immediately seek guidance from the court as to the ad litem's
role, it could be expensive and disruptive to pursue every disagreement to
a hearing during pretrial matters. Thus, the court held that the final fee
hearing was an appropriate forum in which to assert-and preserve-any
objections to the ad litem's fee. 159 The court also held that the defendants
did not waive their objection to certain line item charges by not submit-
ting the ad litem's entire file into the record.160
Texas rules provide that litigants may object to judges sitting by assign-
ment. Normally, an objection is effective automatically when it is filed, as
long as it is filed in a timely manner under Section 74.053 of the Govern-
151. Id. at 532 (emphasis added) (citing Tex. Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Lebco
Constructors, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 68, 77 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied), over-
ruled on other grounds by Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962
S.W.2d 507, 530 (Tex. 1998)); TEX. R. Civ. P. 233.
152. M.N.G., 147 S.W.3d at 532 (emphasis added).
153. Id.
154. 35 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
155. Id. at 64.
156. M.N.G., 147 S.W.3d at 533.
157. 133 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam).
158. Id. at 270.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 271.
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ment Code. 61 But one recent case suggests that even if the objection is
timely filed, it may not preserve error if the objecting party does not en-
sure that the judge is actually aware of the objection. In In re Approxi-
mately $17,239.00,162 the court held that the relator had waived its
objection under section 74.053 to a judge sitting by assignment. The rela-
tor filed its objection on September 22, 2003. A week later, the parties
appeared for a discovery hearing, over which the assigned judge presided.
After the parties argued the motion, but before the judge ruled, the rela-
tor mentioned the previously-filed objection, of which the judge was not
aware. After some discussion, the judge denied the objection, finding
that it was not timely filed. The court of appeals held that although the
objection was filed in a timely manner under the newly-amended version
of section 74.053, the relator waived its objection.163 The court conceded
that a timely-filed objection is normally effective upon filing, but in this
case the judge was not aware of the objection before the discovery hear-
ing commenced. In order to preserve the issue, the relator should have
made certain that the court was aware of the objection before the com-
mencement of the hearing-even though the objection was already on
file. 164
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In any non-jury case, a party may request findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law within twenty days after the judgment is signed. 165 Upon any
party's timely request for additional findings and conclusions, the trial
court "shall file any additional or amended findings and conclusions that
are appropriate.' 66 The court is only required to make additional find-
ings on ultimate or controlling issues, that is, an issue "that is essential to
the cause of action" and "that would have a direct effect on the judg-
ment."'1 67 The trial court's refusal to make additional findings and con-
clusions under this rule results in reversal unless the record shows no
injury to the complaining party.168 There is also no reversible error if the
party is not prevented from adequately presenting an argument on ap-
peal, or if the requested findings would not result in a different
161. TEX. Gov'T CODE § 74.053 (Vernon 2005); see, e.g., Lewis v. Leftwich, 775 S.W.2d
848, 850-51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, orig. proceeding, no writ).
162. 129 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]).
163. Id. at 169. The 2003 amendments to the rule made significant changes to the sec-
tion defining when an objection is timely. The new rule provides that an objection is timely
if it is filed "not later than the seventh day after the date the party receives actual notice of
the assignment or before the date the first hearing or trial, including pretrial hearings,
commences, whichever date occurs earlier." TEX. Gov'T CODE § 74.053(c) (Vernon 2005).
164. In re Approximately $17,239.00, 129 S.W.3d at 169.
165. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296.
166. TEX. R. Civ. P. 298.
167. In re Marriage of Edwards, 79 S.W.3d 88, 94-95 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no
pet.).
168. See Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2001, pet. denied).
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judgment.1 69
In Flanary v. Mills,1 70 the defendant/appellant argued that the trial
court erred when it stated that the defendant had committed fraud
against the plaintiff, but had not specified the party defrauded. The
plaintiff in Flanary was "Roy Mills d/b/a Row Mills Construction and
Roofing." The defendant requested that the court issue amended find-
ings and conclusions to specifically identify the defrauded party, and the
trial court refused. The court of appeals held that because there was only
one plaintiff, it was not error to specifically identify the party defrauded.
In any event, the court concluded that there is no harm to the defendant
due to the court's failure to specifically identify the party defrauded. 171
In Hoffmann v. Dandurand,172 however, the court held that the trial
court erred in refusing to make additional findings of fact and conclusions
of law on the issue of personal jurisdiction. In Hoffman, the defendant
appealed an interlocutory order denying his special appearance.1 73 The
court's findings of fact did not address the issues raised in the defendant's
special appearance, nor did they address the defendant's minimum con-
tacts, "but rather appear[ed] to reach the merits of the case."' 174 Both
parties requested amended or additional findings, which the trial court
refused. Because the trial court's failure to make sufficient findings and
conclusions on the jurisdictional issue prevented adequate presentation
of the defendant's appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded
for further proceedings. 175
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S PLENARY POWER
A trial court retains jurisdiction over a case for thirty days after it signs
a final judgment or order.176 This time period can be extended to sev-
enty-five days after the judgment date if a party timely files an appropri-
ate post-judgment motion, such as a motion for new trial, within thirty
days of the judgment. 177 The trial court lacks jurisdiction to act in the
matter after its plenary power has expired.1 78
In Martin v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services,179 the
court applied this rule to a motion for sanctions pending after an order of
dismissal on a motion to nonsuit. The DFPS sued Martin seeking the
169. See Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 271, 277 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); ASAI v. Vanco Insulation Abatement, Inc., 932 S.W.2d 118,
122 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
170. 150 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied).
171. Id. at 793.
172. 143 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
173. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 2004-
2005).
174. Hoffman, 143 S.W.3d at 560.
175. Id.
176. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d).
177. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
178. Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex. 1988).
179. Martin v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01-03-01111-CV, 2004 WL
1945255 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2004, no pet.).
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termination of her parental rights. On November 20, 2002 Martin filed a
motion for sanctions; on the same day, DFPS moved to nonsuit its claims.
The trial court granted the motion for nonsuit. In February 2003, Martin
served discovery upon DFPS, to which DFPS responded. Martin later
served additional discovery requests, and when DFPS refused to respond,
Martin filed a motion to compel. DFPS responded with a plea to the
jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. Noting that the trial court re-
tains jurisdiction for thirty days after signing a final order of nonsuit, the
court held that plenary power expired. Although Martin moved for sanc-
tions before the nonsuit was signed and thus it remained pending when
the final order was issued, the court held that a judgment need not re-
solve an outstanding motion for sanctions in order to be final. 180 In so
holding, the court expressly disapproved of prior cases holding that a mo-
tion for sanctions survives a nonsuit.
Not all postjudgment motions will extend the court's plenary power.
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals clarified recently that unlike a
motion for new trial, a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law
does not extend the court's plenary power even though it might extend
the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. 81 In so holding, the court over-
ruled a prior panel's holding that suggested that a request for findings
and conclusions did extend plenary power.18 2
VI. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
"The appellate record consists of the clerk's record and, if necessary to
the appeal, the reporter's record. ' 183 The appellant is responsible for ar-
ranging for the record to be provided to the court of appeals. Failure to
comply with the procedures in Rule 34 may result in refusal of the court
to consider the appellant's appeal. A number of cases recently addressed
the record on appeal and the steps necessary to ensure the court is pro-
vided with an accurate record.
As an initial matter, the appellant is not necessarily required to have
the entire reporter's record provided on appeal.184 However, when
designating less than the entire record, the appellant must ensure that all
items relevant to the appeal are included. In Coleman v. Carpenter,1 85
the court noted that the court presumes a partial reporter's record desig-
nated by the parties constitutes the entire record for the purposes of its
review. Rule 34.6(c)(1) requires the appellant to specify issues presented
180. Id. at *2.
181. In re Gillespie, 124 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, orig.
proceeding, no pet.) (en banc).
182. Id. at 704 (overruling Elec. Power Design, Inc. v. R.A. Hanson Co., 821 S.W.2d 170
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) to the extent that it held that a request for
findings and conclusions extended plenary power); see also TEX. R. App. P. 26.1; TEX. R.
Civ. P. 329b.
183. TEX. R. App. P. 34.1.
184. See TEX. R. App. P. 34.5(a), 34.6(b)(1).
185. 132 S.W.3d 108 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.).
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on appeal when filing a partial record, and the court will limit the appel-
lant to those issues. If the appellant fails to comply with this rule, there is
a "presumption that the omitted parts of the record are relevant to the
disposition of the appeal, and that they support the trial court's rul-
ing."'186 Although noting that the Texas Supreme Court has not required
literal compliance with the rule, 187 the court held "that 'complete failure'
to file the required statement of points would require the appellate court
to affirm the trial court's judgment." 188 The Dallas Court of Appeals in
$4,310 in U.S. Currency v. State,189 stressed that this rule applies equally
to pro se litigants.
If the appellant fails to designate the entire record, Texas Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 34.6(d)1 90 allows the reporter's record to be supple-
mented, and Rule 34.6(b)(3) 191 prohibits an appellate court from refusing
to file a supplemental reporter's record for failure to timely request it.
However, in Daniels v. University of Texas Health Science Center of
Tyler,192 the court held that "these rules apply only where a reporter's
record has been filed with the appellate court. ' 193 As a result, because
the appellant had not previously filed or requested a reporter's record
and had filed a motion for leave to supplement the reporter's record at
the same time she filed her appellant's brief, the court held that appellant
was not entitled to file a supplemental reporter's record "because there is
no reporter's record to supplement. 1 194 The court rejected appellant's
argument that she was merely seeking to provide a court reporter's certi-
fication that certain of her medical records and deposition excerpts con-
tained in the clerk's record filed in the appeal and "certainly" introduced
at trial were "in fact admitted exhibits," holding that "[a]n appellant can-
not circumvent the rules relating to the filing of a reporter's record by
furnishing a court reporter's certification relating to matters included in
the clerk's record."1 95 The court similarly found appellant's argument
that she did not file a complete reporter's record because of the expense
186. Id. at 110.
187. Id. (citing Schafer v. Conner, 813 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. 1991); Gallagher v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 950 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1997); Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d
375, 377 (Tex. 2001)).
188. Id.
189. 133 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
190. TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(d): ("If anything relevant is omitted from the reporter's re-
cord, the trial court, the appellate court, or any party may by letter direct the official court
reporter to prepare, certify, and file in the appellate court a supplemental reporter's record
containing the omitted items. Any supplemental reporter's record is part of the appellate
record.").
191. TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(b)(3) (stating in relevant part: "Additions requested by an-
other party must be included in the reporter's record at the appellant's cost.").
192. Daniels v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. of Tyler, No. 12-03-00399-CV, 2004 WL
1795348 (Tex. App.-Tyler Aug. 11, 2004, no pet.).
193. Id. at *1.
194. Id. at *2 (citing Aluminum Chems. (Bolivia), Inc. v. Bechtel Corp., 28 S.W.3d 49,
50 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Belknap Van & Storage,
893 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ)).
195. Id. at *2-3.
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to be unpersuasive, noting that appellant made no effort to file a partial
reporter's record or an agreed reporter's record.196
VII. THE BRIEF ON APPEAL
The rules of appellate procedure provide that in an accelerated appeal,
"[tihe appellate court may allow the case to be submitted without
briefs. ' 197 The case of In re J.S.198 recently clarified the meaning of this
rule, stressing that whether a brief is required is within the court's discre-
tion, not the appellant's; "An appellant who believes that briefs are un-
necessary may not simply announce its decision not to file a brief.
Instead, an appellant must file a proper motion, accompanied by the ap-
propriate filing fee, and must demonstrate why briefs should not be re-
quired." 199 The J.S. court noted that, without briefing, the court must
step into the unnatural role of advocate, and thus it will exercise its dis-
cretion to dispense with briefing only in extraordinary circumstances. '200
Parties frequently frame their issues on appeal to cover numerous spe-
cific points. In doing so, however, the parties must take care to specifi-
cally address those issues in briefing. For example, in Cruikshank v.
Consumer Direct Mortgage, Inc.,201 the court noted the general rule that a
point of error stating that the trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment is sufficient to preserve error and allow argument on all possible
grounds on which summary judgment should have been denied.20 2 The
court held, however, that a general Malooly point of error only preserves
a complaint on appeal if it is actually supported by argument in the
briefs. 20 3 Because the appellant did not address his specific issues in his
brief, any error was waived.20 4
VIII. WAIVER ON APPEAL
The rules of appellate procedure require that the appellant's brief con-
tain "a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appro-
priate citations to authorities and to the record. '20 5 Courts have
frequently held that an issue is waived on appeal if it is unsupported by
argument or citation to legal authority. In the case of Strange v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co.,206 the court restated this, and stressed that it applies
equally to pro se litigants. Although the trial court "went to great lengths
to afford [the] appellant the opportunity to try her case," the court has
196. Id. at *3 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(c) (partial reporter's record); TEX. R. App. P.
34.2 (agreed reporter's record)).
197. TEX. R. App. P. 28.3.
198. 136 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.).
199. Id. at 717.
200. Id.
201. 138 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
202. Id. at 502 (citing Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. 1970)).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 503.
205. TEX. R. App. P. 38.1(h).
206. 126 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
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"little latitude on appeal. '20 7 Because the appellant's brief cited neither
legal authorities nor the record, she waived all points on appeal. 20 8
This rule has been applied by one court to hold that not only must the
appellant cite legal authority, he must also cite authority arising under the
controlling statute. In the case of Bankhead v. Maddox,209 the appellant
argued on appeal that the trial court erred in not awarding her attorneys'
fees as a matter of law when the jury awarded breach of contract damages
but awarded nothing as reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees. The
appellant raised a claim for damages arising from a construction defect
under a breach of contract theory. However, claims arising out of an al-
leged construction defect are controlled by a specific provision of the
Texas Residential Construction Liability Act ("RCLA"). 210 The appel-
lant's brief argued that she was entitled to attorneys' fees under case law
stemming from the Civil Practice and Remedies Code's provision for
breach of contract cases.21' The court held that because she did not cite
cases addressing the RCLA, she waived her claim for attorneys' fees.
2 12
A corollary to this rule is that an appellant cannot raise an argument
for the first time in her reply brief. For example, in Lopez v.
Montemayor,213 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that an argument
that the appellants raised only in their reply brief was not properly before
the court. In Lopez, the plaintiffs' medical malpractice case was dis-
missed for failure to file an adequate expert report as required by article
4590i, section 13.01 of the revised civil statutes. 214 The trial court deter-
mined that the plaintiffs' expert report did not adequately present causa-
tion. The plaintiffs' reply brief pointed to a second expert report they
claimed supported causation. Because neither the appellants' nor the ap-
pellees' briefs addressed this additional expert report, the court of ap-
peals would not consider the new argument. In another case, this rule
was applied to find waiver on appeal-even though the appellant's reply
brief addressed issues specifically raised in the appellee's brief.
215
IX. RESTRICTED APPEALS
A restricted appeal must "(1) be brought within six months after the
trial court signs the judgment, (2) by a party to the suit, (3) who, either in
person or through counsel, did not participate at trial, and (4) the error
complained of must be apparent from the face of the record. '216 The
207. Id. at 678.
208. Id.
209. 135 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2004, no pet.).
210. TEX. PROP. CODE § 27.002 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
211. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001 (Vernon 1997).
212. Bankhead, 135 S.W.3d at 164.
213. 131 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).
214. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 4590i, § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
215. Bankhead, 135 S.W.3d at 164-65 (holding that proper authority should have been
raised in appellant's initial brief).
216. Rivero v. Blue Keel Funding, L.L.C., 127 S.W.3d 421, 423 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2004, no pet.); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c), 30; see also Armendariz v. Barragan, 143 S.W.3d
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issue when analyzing the participation requirement of a restricted appeal
"is whether appellant took part in the decision-making event that results
in the adjudication of his rights. '2 17 In the summary judgment context, a
party who takes part in all necessary steps of the summary judgment pro-
ceedings, but merely fails to attend the hearing, "participated at trial" for
purposes of a restricted appeal. However, a party who does not respond
to or appear at the hearing on a motion for summary judgment does "not
participate in the actual decision-making event from which the judgment
against him resulted" and may challenge the judgment by restricted
appeal. 218
Review by restricted appeal "entitles the appellant to the same scope
of appeal as an ordinary appeal, except the error must appear on the face
of the record. ' 219 For purposes of a restricted appeal, "the record con-
sists of all documents on file with the trial court at the time of
judgment." 220
X. REVIEW AND DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
A. VENUE RULINGS
Generally, as a part of appellate review, the Texas appellate courts are
required to presume that a trial court's order that does not specify
grounds is correct if any meritorious ground was before the trial court.221
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court in Garza v. Garcia
analyzed this rule in the context of venue determinations, in which appel-
late review of convenience transfers is precluded by statute.222 Specifi-
cally, under section 15.002(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, a trial court's decision to transfer venue for the convenience rea-
sons is "not grounds for appeal or mandamus and is not reversible er-
ror."223 What if the motion to transfer venue asserts both improper
venue and inconvenience, and the trial court grants the motion without
specifying the grounds? Is the ruling reviewable on appeal?
Applying the presumption in favor of unspecfic orders outlined above,
the majority in Garza said no, the ruling is not reviewable on appeal,
even though the court could not be certain that the motion was granted
on convenience grounds.224 In reaching this conclusion, the majority ac-
knowledged that "it is irrelevant whether a transfer for convenience is
853, 854 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) ("A restricted appeal (1) must be brought
within six months of the date of judgment; (2) by a party to the suit; (3) who did not
participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and who did not file
a timely post-judgment motion; and (4) the error must be apparent from the face of the
record.").
217. Rivero, 127 S.W.3d at 423-24.
218. Id. at 424.
219. Armendariz, 143 S.W.3d at 854.
220. Id.
221. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993).
222. 137 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. 2004).
223. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(c) (Vernon 2002).
224. Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 39.
[Vol. 58
Appellate Practice and Procedure
supported by any record evidence. ' 225 In fact, the court admitted that,
because transfer orders based on convenience may not be reviewed on
appeal, a trial court could overtly state that there was no evidence for a
convenience transfer, and there is little an appellate court could do about
it. 2
2 6
The dissenting justices disagreed with the majority's analysis, arguing
that trial courts should be required to state the basis for a transfer in the
transfer order or otherwise in findings in the record when the grant of a
motion to transfer venue is based on convenience of the parties.22 7 This
is important because, if the trial court transferred the case based on an
improper venue analysis (as opposed to convenience), that ruling is auto-
matically reversible under legislative mandate. 228 To preserve this man-
date, the dissenters maintained, the trial court needs to clarify its basis for
transferring the case.2 2
9
B. CLASS CERTIFICATION RULINGS
Subparts (b) and (c) of Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
provide two separate bases for certifying a lawsuit as a class action. Sub-
part (b) allows certification when the principal claim in the case is one for
declaratory or injunctive relief.230 Subpart (b)(3) contemplates certifica-
tion in cases where issues of "law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members
and a class action is superior to other available methods for [the fair and
efficient] adjudication of the controversy." '231
In Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, the supreme court held that
"[c]ourts must perform a 'rigorous analysis' before ruling on class certifi-
cation to determine whether all prerequisites to certification have been
met."'2 32 While Bernal involved certification under Rule 42(b)(3), the su-
preme court clarified in Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray that the
same "rigorous analysis" applies in Rule 42(b)(2) cases.2 33 The focus in a
Rule 42(b)(2) case, however, is on the requirement of "cohesiveness"-
the trial court must rigorously analyze the cohesiveness and homogeneity
of the class. According to the supreme court, in many cases, "this analy-
sis will be identical to the 'predominance and superiority' directive under-
taken by trial courts certifying (b)(3) classes. '234
In the wake of Bernal and LaPray, is the standard of review for class
certification decisions still abuse of discretion? According to the Texar-
225. Id. (emphasis added).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 44-45 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting, joined by Wainwright, J.).
228. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 2002).
229. Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 45.
230. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(2).
231. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(3).
232. 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000).




kana Court of Appeals, the standard is the same, although Bernal's use of
the term "rigorous analysis" instructs the courts of appeals "to review the
certification under an abuse of discretion standard, provided that the trial
court exercised its discretion within the framework of the rule."235
XI. MOOT APPEALS
Under the "acceptance-of-benefits doctrine," a litigant "cannot treat a
judgment as both right and wrong. '236 As a result, if a party "voluntarily
accepts the benefits of a judgment, she is barred by the acceptance-of-
benefits doctrine from appealing it.' ' 237 Notably, this rule applies only if
the acceptance is voluntary. It does not apply to a party "who is com-
pelled to accept the benefits of a judgment by 'economic circum-
stances."' 238 Accordingly, the doctrine does not apply to a party who
accepts benefits awarded in a divorce decree to provide for necessities,
including basic living expenses. 239
Rule 7.1(a)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
that, if a party to a civil appeal dies during the pendency of an appeal, the
court of appeals will adjudicate the appeal "as if all parties were alive. 240
However, "[i]f the death of the party results in the end of any controversy
between the parties, then the appeal is rendered moot and is dis-
missed. ' 241 But if a remaining claim involves the property rights of the
parties, "then the claim survives the death of a party. '2 42
235. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Fin., Inc. v. Posey, 146 S.W.3d 302, 311 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2004, no pet.) (emphasis added).
236. Garza v. Garza, 155 S.W.3d 471, 474-75 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.)
237. Id. (emphasis added).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. TEx. R. App. P. 7.1(a)(1).
241. Kenseth v. Dallas County, 126 S.W.3d 584, 593 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet.
denied).
242. Id. at 593-94 (concluding that appeal of judgment assessing sanctions against ap-
pellant of $65,500 was not mooted by his death).
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